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1 Introduction
Financialisation can be defined as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets,
financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of domestic and international eco-
nomies” Epstein (2005, p.3). In this paper we focus on the role of dividends paid by firms
and banks to shareholders as one of the phenomenon that increases the weight of finance in
the whole economic system.
Regarding the modeling framework we analyse the effects of financialisation on macroe-
conomic dynamics in an agent based macroeconomic setting, as described in Riccetti et al.
(2012), in which the macroeconomy is a complex system populated by heterogeneous agents
(households, firms and banks) which directly interact in different markets (goods, labour,
credit, and bank deposits). There are two policy makers: the government and the central
bank. In this context, aggregate regularities emerge from the “bottom up” (Epstein and Ax-
tell, 1996) as statistical properties at the meso and macro levels that derive from the (simple
and adaptive) individual behavioral rules and the interaction mechanisms which describe the
working of markets (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008).
As we will see, increasing dividends can make the system financially unstable and can
have relevant consequences on income distribution. In fact, firms that only pay dividends
are largely extinct.1 Repurchases are increasingly used in place of dividends, even for firms
that continue to pay dividends. On these bases, Skinner (2008) suggests that repurchases
are now the dominant form of payout. To be more precise, aggregate real dividends paid
by industrial firms increased over the past two decades even though, as shown by Fama and
French (2001), the number of dividend payers decreased by over 50%; in particular, DeAngelo
et al. (2004) find that (i) the reduction in payers occurs almost entirely among firms that paid
very small dividends, and (ii) increased real dividends from the top payers swamp the modest
dividend reduction from the loss of many small payers. Such a behaviour reflects high and
increasing concentration in the supply of dividends which, in turn, reflects high and increasing
concentration of earnings. For instance, the 25 firms that paid the largest dividends in 2000
account for a majority of the aggregate dividends and earnings of industrial firms. (DeAngelo
et al., 2004).
Moreover, “over the decade 2001-2010, the 500 corporations in the S&P 500 Index (rep-
resenting about 75 percent of US stock-market capitalization) expended not only 40 percent
of their profits on cash dividends – the normal mode of rewarding shareholders – but also
another 54 percent on stock buybacks, the purpose of which is to give a manipulative boost
to a company’s own stock price” (Lazonick, 2013). Morevover, large scale payments of di-
vidends has continued during the “financial crisis”, in spite of widely anticipated credit losses
(Acharya et al, 2011). According to Admati (2012), “money paid to shareholders (or man-
1See Brav et al. (2005) for some evidence on payout policy based on survey and field interviews. For an
international comparison, see Denis and Osobov (2008).
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agers) is no longer available to pay creditors. Share buybacks and dividend payments reduce
the banks’ ability to absorb losses without becoming distressed. When a large “systemic”
bank is distressed, the ripple effects are felt throughout the economy”. Therefore, the lar-
ger the dividends distributed to shareholders the higher the systemic risk due to financial
contagion.
As for the relationship between financialisation and distribution, it may be expected that
shareholders’ demand for higher distributed profits may be passed through to workers resulting
in a decline of the wage share, as stressed by Boyer (2000). According to Hein (2011, p. 298),
“in the medium to the long run increasing shareholder power favours redistribution at the
expense of the labour income share”. While numerous studies have detected the declining
behaviour of the labour share in many countries, only a few contributions investigated the
relationship between financialisation and distribution. For instance, Du¨nhaupt (2013) seeks
to explore the relationship between financialisation and labour’s share of income using a time-
series cross-section data set of 13 countries over the time period from 1986 until 2007. The
results suggest that there is indeed a relationship between increasing dividend and interest
payments of non-financial corporations and the decline of the share of wages in national
income.2
The increase of financial instability as well as the decline of the wage share are the con-
sequence of relevant changes in the macroeconomic system of advanced countries during the
neoliberal era (Russo, 2012). After the stagflation of the 1970s, a series of political decisions
have changed the institutional and organisational settings of capitalist accumulation emerged
after the WWII: the institutional arrangement of capitalist accumulation emerged after the
1970s has resulted in a partial return to the pre-Great Depression “free-market” capitalism,
removing the constraints to financial and economic activity implemented by governments in
response to the post-1929. After the early XX century belle e´poque, a new one emerged dur-
ing the last decades of the same century with some resembling features as the expansion of
finance, growing inequality and increasing instability. There are, then, some relevant simil-
arities between the recent crisis and the post-1929 one, even though differences are perhaps
more numerous, especially if we consider the pervasiveness of finance in the economic and
social life. Our contribution focuses on the increasing role of finance in the economy, through
investigating firms’ and banks’ dividend policies.
Analysing the US macroeconomic trends since the 1960s, van Treeck (2009, p.13) shows
some of the main changes occurred after the 1970s. We summarise these findings - relative
to the two sub-periods, until the early 1980s and since the early 1980s - as follows:
• the income inequality was relatively low and roughly stable, then it has drastically
increased (to levels comparable to the 1920s);
2According to Du¨nhaupt (2013), other factors that can be accounted for the decline relate to globalization
and a decrease in the bargaining power of labour.
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• the personal net worth-to-income ratio was relatively stable or slightly decreasing, then
it has strongly increased;
• the personal saving rate was relatively high and slightly increasing, then it has drastically
declined (reaching negative values for the first time since the early 1930s);
• the personal debt-to-income ratio was relatively low and roughly stable, then it has
drastically increased;
• non-financial corporations retained a large and roughly stable fraction of their net
profits, then they have heavily increased the dividend-payout ratio;
• the growth rate of net capital stock displayed cyclical movements around a relatively
high trend, then it has shown an overall declining trend (with the relevant exception of
the “new economy” boom of the 1990s);
• the contribution of the net new equity issues to the financing of fixed capital investment
by non-financial corporations was small but positive, then it turned to be negative and
very large in absolute value;
• firms’ debt-to-capital ratio was relatively low, then it has increased.
Therefore, the post-1970s deregulation wave has increased inequality and indebtedness
(both for households and firms), promoting a broader role for finance in the working of the
economy. For instance, the US financial corporations’ pre-tax profit rose from an average of
13.9% of all corporate profits in the 1960s to 25.3% in the 1990s and 36.8% in the period 2000-
2006; in general, from the 1970s to the 1990s, there was an increase of the share of national
income received by financial institutions and financial wealth’s holders in the majority of
OECD countries (Epstein and Jayadev, 2005).
A remarkable aspect of the recent phase of capitalist development regards the interplay
between financialisation and economic growth. During the 1980s and 1990s the financial-
isation of nonfinancial corporations has emerged as a relevant phenomenon and it is now a
well documented phenomenon for the US economy. As noted by Orhangazi (2007), before
financialisation clearly emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, Tobin (1965) maintained that real
investment and financial investment could be substitutes because when financial assets offer
higher returns then real activities more resources will be directed to finance, resulting in a
crowd-out of real investments. Using data from a sample of nonfinancial corporations from
1973 to 2003, Orhangazi (2007) finds a negative relationships between real and financial in-
vestment. From this firm-level investigation it emerges that two aspects of financialisation
may have negative consequences on real investment, especially in the case of large firms: first,
high financial profit opportunities result in higher financial investment, leading to a decline of
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real capital accumulation; second, increased financial payments leave firms with fewer funds
to invest and shorten the planning horizon of firms’ management.
According to Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000), the financialisation of nonfinancial corpor-
ations has been characterised by a shift from a retain and reinvest strategy to a downsize
and distribute strategy; that is, management strategies have changed focussing more on the
maximisation of shareholder value and less on long-term growth. In fact, the profit share
increase of recent decades has been accompanied by the stagnation of real investment and a
sharply increase of interest payments, dividend payments and stock buybacks (also mergers
and acquisitions may be considered).
Stockhammer (2004) confirms that over the past decades the financial investment of nonfin-
ancial corporations has been rising and the accumulation of capital goods has been declining.
According to this author, the “shareholder revolution” and the development of a market for
corporate control have shifted power to shareholders and thus changed management priorities,
so leading to a reduction of growth rates. From the analysis of the time series of aggregate
investment for the USA, the UK, France and Germany, it results that financialisation has
been responsible for a slowdown of accumulation (in particular, for the first three countries).
Similar results have been reached by Crotty (2005), according to which nonfinancial cor-
porations have increased financial investments as response to high interest rates and to low
rates of profit associated to real investments, and Dumenil and Levy (2005), according to
which the growth rate of real capital accumulation depends on that of retained profits (that
is, profit after interest and dividend payments), which is diminished in recent decades.
All in all, financialisation has been a fundamental factor behind the recovery of profits from
the 1980s in the leading capitalist economy as well as a phenomenon involved in a slowdown of
real capital accumulation. Unsurprisingly, the average growth rate of most advanced countries,
during the US financial expansion of the post-1970s, has been lower than in the post-WWII
“regulated capitalism”.
In the present paper we analyse the role of dividends distributed by firms and banks,
highlighting the effects of their increase on financial instability and macroeconomic dynamics.
In particular, the financialisation of nonfinancial corporations has been characterised by a
shift from a “retain and reinvest” strategy to a “downsize and distribute” strategy. We
will investigate such a phenomenon by varying some of the model parameters, so simulating
firms’ and banks’ behaviours under alternative settings. On the one hand, more distributed
dividends increases agents’ wealth and, then, consumption may rise due to a wealth-effect.
On the other hand, increasing dividends reduce firms’ net worth that may result in a strong
dependence of firms’ production on bank credit; at the same time, if also banks distribute
more dividends, then banks’ capital decreases and this may result in credit rationing. As
we will see, financialisation through increasing dividends impacts financial (in)stability and
income distribution, with relevant consequences on macroeconomic dynamics and interesting
implications for economic policy.
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The paper is organised as follows. After this Introduction, we present the modelling
framework in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss simulation results: first, we briefly de-
scribe the dynamic behaviour of the model in the baseline scenario; then, we perform some
computational experiments to assess the relevance of dividends on financial instability and
macroeconomic dynamics. Finally, Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The model
This paper is based on the model reported in Riccetti et al. (2012). Our economy evolves
over a time span t = 1, 2, ..., T and is composed by households (h = 1, 2, ..., H), firms (f =
1, 2, ..., F ), banks (b = 1, 2, ..., B), a central bank, and the government. Agents are boundedly
rational and live in an incomplete and asymmetric information context, thus they follow
simple rules of behaviour and use adaptive expectations.
Agents interact in four markets: (i) credit market; (ii) labour market; (iii) goods market; (iv)
deposit market. The interaction between the demand (firms in the credit and labour markets,
households in the goods market, and banks in the deposit market) and the supply (banks
in the credit market, households in the labour and deposit markets, and firms in the goods
market) sides of the four markets follows a common decentralized matching protocol, even if
each agent in the demand side observes a list of potential counterparts in the supply side and
chooses the most suitable partner according to some market-specific criteria. In particular,
the interaction develops in the following way: a random list of agents in the demand side is
set, then the first agent in the list observes a random subset of potential partners, whose size
depends on a parameter 0 < χ ≤ 1 (which proxies the degree of imperfect information), and
chooses the cheapest one. After that, the second agent on the list performs the same activity
on a new random subset of the updated potential partner list. The process iterates till the
end of the demand side list. Subsequently, a new random list of agents in the demand side is
set and the whole matching mechanism goes on until either one side of the market (demand
or supply) is empty or no further matchings are feasible because the highest bid (for example,
the money till available to the richest firm) is lower than the lowest ask (for example, the
lowest wage asked by till unemployed workers).
Now, we briefly explain the main features of the four markets. However, for a detailed
description of the markets, we refer to Riccetti et al. (2012).
2.1 Markets
2.1.1 Credit market
In each period, at first firms and banks interact in the credit market. Firm’s f credit demand
at time t depends on its net worth Aft and the leverage target lft. Hence, required credit is:
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Bdft = Aft · lft (1)
The evolution of the leverage target changes according to expected profits and inventories:
if expected profits are above expected interest rate and there are few inventories, the firm
enlarges its target leverage, and viceversa. Therefore, we implement a version of the Dynamic
Trade-Off Theory (Flannery and Rangan, 2006) based on adaptive rules of firm’s behaviour.3
Banks set their credit supply Bdbt depending on their net worth Abt, deposits Dbt, and the
quantity of money provided by the central bank mbt. However, they must comply with some
regulatory constraints: the maximum admissible leverage, the maximum percentage of capital
to be invested in lending activities and the maximum risk concentration (that is, banks lend
to a single firm up to a maximum fraction β of the total amount of the credit Bdbt).
Under asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), bank b charges an interest rate on
the firm f at time t according to the following equation:
ibft = iCBt + iˆbt + i¯ft (2)
where iCBt is the nominal interest rate set by the central bank at time t, iˆbt is a bank-
specific component, and i¯ft = ρ
lft/100 is a firm-specific component, that is a risk premium
on firm target leverage (with ρ > 0).
The bank-specific component decreases if the bank did not manage to lend to firms all the
credit supply. Indeed, at the end of the interaction mechanism, each firm ends up with a
credit Bft ≤ B
d
ft and each bank lends to firms an amount Bbt ≤ B
d
bt. The difference between
desired and effective credit is equal to Bdft − Bft = Bˆft and B
d
bt − Bbt = Bˆbt, for firms and
banks respectively.
Moreover, we assume that banks try to invest residual credit supply in government securities.
If the sum of desired government bonds exceeds the amount of outstanding public debt then
the effective investment is proportionally rescaled. Instead, if public debt exceeds the banks’
desired demand, then the central bank buys the residual amount.
2.1.2 Labour market
Government, firms and households interact in the labour market. On the demand side, first
of all, the government hires a fraction g of households. The remaining part is available for
working in the firms. Firm’s f labour demand depends on available funds, that is net worth
and bank credit: Aft +Bft.
On the supply side each worker posts a wage wht which increases if he/she was employed in
the previous period and viceversa. Moreover, the required wage has a minimum related to
3A previous implementation of such a framework for the firms’ financial structure has been proposed in
Riccetti et al. (2013) which, in turn, partially modified the working of the network-based financial accelerator
proposed by Delli Gatti et al. (2010).
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the price of a good.
As a result of the decentralized matching between labour supply and demand, each firm ends
up with a number of workers nft and a residual cash (insufficient to hire an additional worker)
and a fraction of households may remain unemployed. The wage of unemployed people is set
equal to zero.
2.1.3 Goods market
Subsequently, households and firms interact in the goods market. On the demand side,
households set the desired consumption on the basis of their disposable income and wealth.
Firms produce consumption goods on the basis of hired workers as follows:
yft = φ · nft (3)
where φ ≥ 1 is a productivity parameter. They put in the goods market their current period
production and previous period inventories yˆft−1. The selling price increases if in the previous
period the firm managed to sell all the output, while it reduces if it had positive inventories.
Moreover, the minimum price at which the firm want to sell its output is set such that it is
at least equal to the average cost of production, that is ex-ante profits are at worst equal to
zero.
As a consequence of the interaction between the supply and demand sides in the goods market,
each household ends up with a residual cash, that is not enough to buy an additional good
and that she will try to deposit in a bank. At the same time, firms may remain with unsold
goods (inventories), that they will try to sell in the next period.
2.1.4 Deposit market
Banks and households interact in the deposit market. Banks represent the demand side and
households are on the supply side. Banks offer an interest rate on deposits according to
their funds requirement: if a bank exhausts the credit supply by lending to private firms or
government then it decides to increase the interest rate paid on deposits, so to attract new
depositors, and viceversa. However, the interest rate on deposits can increase till a maximum
given by the policy rate rCBt which is both the rate at which banks could refinance from the
central bank and the rate paid by the government on public bonds.
Households determine their savings to be deposited in banks as the desired savings plus the
residual cash at the end of the interaction in the consumption market. Moreover, they set
the minimum interest rate they want to obtain on bank deposits as follows: a household that
in the previous period found a bank paying an interest rate higher or equal to the desired
one decides to ask for a higher remuneration. In the opposite case, she did not find a bank
satisfying her requirements, thus she kept her money in cash and now she asks for a lower
rate. We hypothesize that a household deposits all the available money in a single bank that
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offers an adequate interest rate. A household that decides to not deposit her money in a bank
signals a preference for liquidity.
2.2 Profits, dividends and wealth dynamics
2.2.1 Firms
At the end of the interaction in the credit, labour and goods markets, every firm f calculates
its profit/loss:
pift = pft · y¯ft −Wft − Ift (4)
where pft is the price set by the firm f on its goods, y¯ft are the sold goods, Wft is the
sum of wages paid to employed workers, and Ift is the sum of interests paid on bank loans.
Firms pay a proportional tax τ on positive profits; however, firms can subtract previous
negative profits in the calculation of the tax base. After taxes, we indicate net profits with
p¯ift.
Finally, firms pay a percentage δˆft as dividends on positive net profits. The fraction 0 ≤ δˆft ≤
1 evolves according to the following rule:
δˆft = δ¯f + δft (5)
with:
δft =
8
<
:
δft−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if yˆft = 0 and yft > 0
δft−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if yˆft > 0 or yft = 0
(6)
and with 0 < α < 1 as adjustment parameter. The previous equation means that dividends
go down if in the previous period the firm produces and sells all the goods (no inventories),
then it wants to retain a larger share of profits to enlarge the production, and viceversa.
The profit net of taxes and dividends is indicated by pˆift. In case of negative profits pˆift = pift.
Thus, the evolution of firm f ’s net worth is given by:
Aft = (1− τ
′) · [Aft−1 + pˆift] (7)
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a threshold τ¯ ′ · p¯, that
is a multiple of the average goods price).
If Aft ≤ 0 then the firm goes bankrupt and a new entrant replaces the bankrupted agent
according to a one-to-one replacement. Banks linked to defaulted firms lose a fraction of their
loans calculated as (Aft +Bft)/Bft: this is the recovery rate.
The new entrant starts with an initial net worth equal to a multiple of the average goods
price and the money needed to finance entrants is subtract from households’ wealth. We set
to one the leverage of the new firm. Moreover, the entrant sets an initial price for its gooods
equal to the mean price of survival firms.
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2.2.2 Banks
As a result of interaction in the credit and the deposit markets, the bank b’s profit is equal
to:
pibt = intbt + i
Γ
t · Γbt − i
D
bt−1 ·Dbt−1 − i
t
CB ·mbt − badbt (8)
where intbt represents the interests gained by bank b on lending to non-defaulted firms, i
Γ
t
is the interest rate on government securities Γbt, i
D
bt−1 is the interest rate paid on the sum
of deposits Dbt−1, i
t
CB is the interest rate paid on the amount of money mbt required to the
Central Bank, and badbt is the amount of “bad debt” due to bankrupted firms. Bad debt
is the loss given default of the total loan, that is a fraction 1 less the recovery rate (see the
previous subsection) of the loan.
Banks pay a proportional tax τ on positive profits; however, they subtract previous negative
profits in the calculation of the tax base. We indicate net profits with p¯ibt.
Finally, banks pay a percentage δˆbt as dividends on positive net profits. The fraction 0 ≤
δˆbt ≤ 1 evolves according to the following rule:
δˆbt = δ¯b + δbt (9)
where:
δbt =
8
<
:
δbt−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if Bbt > 0 and Bˆbt = 0
δbt−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if Bbt = 0 or Bˆbt > 0
(10)
That is, if the bank does not manage to lend the desired supply of credit then it decides
to distribute more dividends (because it does not need high reinvested profits), and viceversa.
The profit net of taxes and dividends is indicated by pˆibt. In case of negative profits
pˆibt = pibt.
Thus, the bank b’s net worth evolves as follows:
Abt = (1− τ
′) · [Abt−1 + pˆibt] (11)
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a threshold τ¯ ′ · p¯,
that is a multiple of the average goods price).
If Abt ≤ 0 then the bank is in default and a new entrant takes its place. Households linked
to defaulted banks lose a fraction of their deposits (the loss given default rate is calculated
as 1− (Abt +Dbt)/Dbt). The initial net worth of the new entrant is a multiple of the average
goods price. Moreover, the initial bank-specific component of the interest rate (ˆibt) is equal
to the mean value across banks.
2.2.3 Households
According to the operations in the labour, goods, and deposit markets, the household h’s
wealth evolves as follows:
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Aht = (1− τ
′) · [Aht−1 + (1− τ) · wht + divht + int
D
ht − cht] (12)
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a threshold τ¯ ′ · p¯,
that is a multiple of the average goods price), τ is the tax rate on income, wht is the wage
gained by employed workers, divht is the fraction (proportional to the household h’s wealth
compared to overall households’ wealth) of dividends distributed by firms and banks net of
the amount of resources needed to finance new entrants (hence, this value may be negative),
intDht represents interests on deposits, and cht is the effective consumption. Households linked
to defaulted banks lose a fraction of their deposits as already explained.
2.3 Government and central bank
Government’s current expenditure is given by the sum of wages paid to public workers (Gt)
and the interests paid on public debt to banks. Moreover, government collects taxes on
incomes and wealth and receives interests gained by the central bank. The difference between
expenditures and revenues is the public deficit Ψt. Consequently, public debt is Γt = Γt−1+Ψt.
Central bank decides the policy rate iCBt and the quantity of money to put into the
system in accordance with the interest rate. In order to do that, the central bank observes
the aggregate excess supply or demand in the credit market and sets an amount of money Mt
to reduce the gap in the subsequent period of time.
3 Simulations
We explore the dynamics of the model by means of computer simulations. We refer to Riccetti
et al. (2012) for the details about the parameter setting, the initial conditions and the results
of the baseline model that we will sum up in the next subsection.
3.1 Baseline model results
With the baseline setting we perform two Monte Carlo analyses with two different time span.
The first analysis exploits 1000 Monte Carlo simulations over a “short” time horizon of 150
periods, of which we examine the results for the last 50, because the first 100 periods are used
to initialise the model. The second study regards 100 Monte Carlo simulations over a “long”
time span of 500 periods (however, again, the first 100 are used to initialise the model).
In 995 out of 1000 of the “short” simulations and in 98 out of 100 of the “long” Monte Carlo
simulations, we observe the emergence of endogenous business cycles with the following pat-
tern: an increase of firms’ profits determines an expansion of production and, if banks extend
the required credit, this effect could be amplified resulting in more employment; the fall of
the unemployment rate increases wage inflation that, on the one hand, expands the aggregate
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demand, while on the other hand reduces firms’ profits, possibly causing the inversion of the
business cycle. Then, we can notice a “real” economy engine given by the dynamic relation
between the unemployment and the profit rate, enlarged by a financial accelerator mechan-
ism. The “real” mechanism is that an increase of profits boosts the expansion of the economy
and then a fall of the unemployment rate follows; the low unemployment increases wages,
so firms try to save on production costs reducing labour demand. This results in a rise of
unemployment that lowers the profit rate at the subsequent period due to a lack of aggregate
demand. However, the presence of unemployed people decreases wages and this makes firms
to hire a larger number of workers, so boosting the beginning of a new expansionary phase of
the business cycle.
Firms’ leverage and banks’ exposure are the financial drivers that enlarge business fluctu-
ations: growing firms ask for more credit and, if banks extended new loans, then they expand
the production; subsequently, the low unemployment fosters wages that, together with the
rise of interest payments on an increasing debt, reduces firms’ profitability. Thus, the busi-
ness cycle reverses and financial factors amplify the recession, indeed the relatively low level
of profits with respect to interest payments induces a deleveraging process. According to the
empirical evidence (for example, Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2011), there is a negative but mod-
est correlation between firms’ leverage and the unemployment rate, while there is a more
significant negative correlation between banks’ exposure and unemployment. Then, banks’
capitalization is the most important determinant of credit conditions, so influencing firms’
leverage and the macroeconomic evolution.
The business fluctuations are mitigated by the government, representing an acyclical sec-
tor, that plays a central role to reduce the output volatility through stabilizing the aggregate
demand. However, in 5 out of 1000 “short” simulations and in 2 out of 100 “long” ones, the
system is characterized by large and extended crises, that is the average unemployment rate
reaches values above the 20%. Differently from the usual business cycle mechanism, the re-
duced wages due to growing unemployment does not reverse the cycle, but generates a lack of
aggregate demand that amplifies the recession in a vicious circle for which the fall of purchas-
ing power prevents firms to sell commodities, then firms decrease production, unemployment
continues to rise, and the recession further deteriorates.
3.2 Dividend analysis
In this section we investigate the effects of modifying the percentage of dividends paid on net
profits: in particular, we change the parameters δ¯f (see equation 5) and δ¯b (equation 9). In
the baseline model δ¯f = δ¯b = 0. When we modify both parameters at the same level, for
simplicity we will call them δ¯, that is δ¯ = δ¯f = δ¯b.
We perform two analyses. The first is a sensitivity analysis changing the parameter δ¯ from 0
to 0.45 with 10 steps of 0.05. For each step, we perform 100 simulations over a time span of
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T=150, for an overall amount of 1000 simulations.
The second study checks the impact of the parameter over “long” time horizon simulations.
That is, we run 100 Monte Carlo simulations with T=500 for δ¯ = 0.45 and δ¯ = 0.30, in order
to compare these results with the results emerging from the 100 simulations of the baseline
model over the “long” time span. Moreover, we analyze the impact of different values of δ¯f
and δ¯b, and in particular we explore two combinations: (i) δ¯f = 0.45 and δ¯b = 0, (ii) δ¯f = 0
and δ¯b = 0.45. Overall, we perform an additional set of 400 simulations.
Firstly, we perform the sensitivity analysis on the parameter δ¯ that influences the percent-
age of dividends paid by firms and banks. As already said, we run 1000 simulations for 10
different values of δ¯, from 0 to 0.45 with 0.05 step. At first, we do not consider simulations
with large crisis, defined as simulations in which the mean unemployment rate exceeds the
20%.
Figure 1 displays the impact of parameter δ¯ on the following variables: (i) the dividend
amount on GDP, (ii)-(iii) the dividend percentage on firms and banks net profits, (iv) the
unemployment rate, (v) the unemployment volatility, (vi) firms and banks default rate, (vii)
firms and banks overall profits, (viii) firms and banks total assets, (ix) firms leverage (com-
puted as liabilities on net worth) and banks exposure, (x) the overall credit mismatch (that is
the difference between the aggregate credit supply and the aggregate credit demand), (xi) the
wage share, and (xii) the inflation rate. As expected, when δ¯ grows, the dividends increase
both on GDP and on profits. The dividends growth makes unemployment worse and worse.
This is due to a decrease of reinvested profits, thus firms’ net worth diminishes: firms have
less disposable cash, and then they are able to hire a smaller number of workers. However,
this effect is quite small for 0 ≤ δ¯ ≤ 0.35, because the increase of firms’ profits. Higher profits
make firms to increase their leverage level and, for relatively small level of dividends, this
partially counteracts the impact of the reduced net worth on the overall assets value. Then,
the mean unemployment rate exhibits a slight increase, even if the high leverage makes the
economy less stable as shown by the rise of the unemployment rate’s standard deviation. The
low mean unemployment rate and the increasing “consumption” of profits (because of the high
dividend yield) make firms’ profits higher and higher supporting the macroeconomic system,
as already said. Obviously, the increase of the profit share is connected with a decreasing
wage share; moreover, this feature reduces the inflation rate.
Instead, foru` δ¯ > 0.35 firms’ assets value steepely decreases (see firms total assets panel).
This is due to the joint impact of the reduced firms’ net worth and of the reduced banks’ supplu
of credit. Indeed, when dividends are very high, also banks net worth decreases, reducing the
credit supply (even if banks’ leverage goes up) and causing a growing credit rationing (see
the credit mismatch panel), forcing firms to reduce their leverage. In this setting, the mean
unemployment rate largely grows and also the volatility of the macroeconomic system goes
up, increasing the number of firm and bank defaults, even if the system is still profitable.
However, as already said, in this analysis we are not considering the “large crisis” situ-
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Figure 1: Sensitivity analysis on the impact of the parameter δ¯ – from 0 to 0.45 with step 0.05
– on (i) dividend amount on GDP, (ii) dividend percentage on firms net profits, (iii) dividend
percentage on banks net profits, (iv) unemployment rate, (v) unemployment volatility, (vi)
firms (indicated by a “o”) and banks (“x”) default rate, (vii) firms and banks profits, (viii)
firms and banks assets, (ix) firms leverage and banks exposure, (x) credit mismatch, (xi) wage
share, (xii) inflation rate.
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ations. Indeed, the rise of unemployment can cause a large crisis due to a lack of aggregate
demand, thus implying a fall of the firms’ profit rate and triggers the recession spiral already
explained in section 3.1. In Table 1, we report some statistics about all simulations, that is
including the “large crisis” ones. For some values of δ¯ there are no large crises; in these cases
the numbers in Table 1 are the same as in Figure 1. We can observe that the only significant
changes happen when firms and banks distribute a large fraction of profits by dividends, that
is for δ¯ = 0.45, when three large crises happen, and two of these are situations in which the
economy remains trapped in an almost total disruption of the private sector. In the other
cases, the same comments provided about Figure 1 hold: the economy is almost stable if
0 ≤ δ¯ ≤ 0.35 and significantly changes its state for δ¯ > 0.35. Indeed, if δ¯ > 0.35, overall
dividends are above the 5% of GDP, firms distribute over the 70% of their net profits and
banks distribute over the 60% of their net profits, the macroeconomic system becomes weaker
and weaker, with very bad outcomes: the mean unemployment rate varies from about 10%
(for 0 ≤ δ¯ ≤ 0.35) to 15% (when δ¯ = 0.45), the rate of firm defaults grows from less than 8%
to more than 14%, and the rate of bank defaults increases from about 1% to almost 4.5%.
Table 1: Sensitivity analysis for parameter δ¯ from 0 to 0.45: 100 simulations for each value,
time span 101-150.
δ¯ (%) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Sim. with large crisis 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 3
Dividends on GDP (%) 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.6 3.1 3.8 4.5 5.4 6.0
Mean unemployment rate (%) 9.8 10.8 11.1 10.7 11.3 10.6 10.9 11.3 12.9 15.1
Unemployment std. dev. (%) 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.8 3.8
Wage share (%) 63.5 63.3 63.0 62.8 62.5 62.2 61.6 60.9 59.5 58.6
Firm default rate (%) 6.5 7.5 7.6 6.3 7.3 6.0 7.3 7.9 9.0 14.2
Bank default rate (%) 0.62 1.66 1.69 0.64 1.96 0.94 1.10 1.12 1.57 4.49
To better check for the presence of large crises, we perform a battery of Monte Carlo
simulations over a “long” time horizon T=500 (excluding the first 100 time steps from the
data analysis, which have the role of initializing the system). In section 3.1 we commented the
baseline case, that is δ¯ = 0. Now we propose four new experiments, each with 100 simulations:
• δ¯ = 0.45;
• δ¯ = 0.30;
• δ¯f = 0.45 and δ¯b = 0;
• δ¯f = 0 and δ¯b = 0.45.
The first experiment uses δ¯ = 0.45. In this case a very significant difference emerges with
respect to the baseline scenario: when δ¯ = 0 the economy falls in a large crisis scenario 2
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times over 100 Monte Carlo simulations, while for δ¯ = 0.45 we count 26 simulations with
large crises, that is with a mean unemployment rate above 20%. 12 times out of these 26
simulations, the economy remains trapped in a substantial disruption of the private sector,
that is with an unemployment rate above 50% (consider that we assume the public sector to
hire 1/3 of the households, thus the maximum unemployment is the 66.6%). Instead, in other
11 times simulations present a mean unmeployment rate slightly above 20%. In the last three
cases, the macroeconomy suffers from a long period of large unemployment, but in the “long
run” the system goes back to the “standard” statistical equilibrium, with a cyclical behavior
around a “reasonable” rate of unemployment.
To assess the possibility of short periods of large unemployment even in simulations classi-
fied as without large crisis, we check the maximum unemployment registered between t = 101
and t = 500. Table 2 contains the number of simulations with a maximum unemployment
rate included in the following ranges: less than 20%, between 20% and 30%, between 30% and
40%, between 40% and 50%, between 50% and 60%, and above 60%. According to the data
presented in the table, it is almost impossible that an economy does not face some periods
of strong crisis, when the dividend yield becomes too high (for instance above δ¯ = 0.45). We
repeat the previous analysis in the other three settings itemized above. Indeed, the analysis
on a time horizon equal to T = 150 showed that the economic system does not present very
relevant problems till δ¯ = 0.35, then we decide to check if the system is stable even in the
long run, for a value of δ¯ below this threshold (that is δ¯ = 0.3). For the same reason we
also check for heterogeneity of behaviours between firms and banks: in the short run analysis
we showed that large crises appear when firms do not have enough money to hire workers,
both from internal funds and from bank credit; but, it could also happen that firms with
high dividends reduce their net worth, but banks have more money to lend (δ¯f = 0.45 and
δ¯b = 0) or, conversely, that banks with high dividends reduce their credit supply, but firms
have enough net worth (δ¯f = 0 and δ¯b = 0.45) and a large crisis is avoided. In line with what
we found in the short run analysis, big crises largely reduce compared to the case of δ¯ = 0.45.
However, we can confirm that the probability to face one or more periods of large unemploy-
ment (also in a non large crisis simulation) increases when dividends grow, even if either firms
or banks enlarge their dividends. Moreover, the Monte Carlo with δ¯f = 0.45, that is the worst
case excluding δ¯ = 0.45, presents some simulations in which the mean unemployment rate is
slightly above 20%, differently from the “standard” case.
To sum up, we observe a negative impact of the increasing dividend yield on the economy
(representing a tendency towards the financialisation of the system), even if the relationship
is highly non linear. Indeed, the system does not exhibit large disruptions below a certain
dividend yield threshold, while above that threshold the economy crashes very often. In some
cases, the macroeconomy can remain trapped in a large unemployment crisis for a very long
time. This scenario is more likely when the dividend yield is high, that is when financialisation
makes the system more financially fragile and then more crisis prone. In other words, an
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Table 2: Maximum unemployment for different values of δ¯: 100 simulations for each value,
time span 101-500.
Maximum unemployemnt (%) < 20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 > 60
Number of simulations if δ¯=0 97 1 0 0 0 2
Number of simulations if δ¯=0.45 2 9 24 29 14 22
Number of simulations if δ¯=0.30 72 24 3 0 1 0
Number of simulations if δ¯f=0.45 21 64 8 3 1 3
Number of simulations if δ¯b=0.45 88 5 1 1 1 4
excessive growth of the dividends enlarges financial fragility and consequently macroeconomic
instability, that is the probability to face, sooner or later, a big economic crash with a high
unemployment rate.
4 Concluding remarks
After the stagflation of the 1970s, a series of political decisions have changed the institu-
tional and organisational settings of capitalist accumulation emerged after the WWII: the
institutional arrangement of capitalist accumulation emerged after the 1970s has resulted in a
partial return to the pre-Great Depression “free-market” capitalism, removing the constraints
to financial and economic activity implemented by governments in response to the post-1929.
Our contribution focuses on the increasing role of finance in the economy, through focussing
on firms’ and banks’ dividend policies.
Financialisation of nonfinancial corporations has been characterised by a shift from a “re-
tain and reinvest” strategy to a “downsize and distribute” strategy; that is, management
strategies have changed focussing more on the maximisation of shareholder value and less on
long-term growth. In fact, the profit share increase of recent decades has been accompanied
by the stagnation of real investment and a sharply increase of interest payments, dividend
payments and stock buybacks (also mergers and acquisitions may be considered). The “share-
holder revolution” and the development of a market for corporate control have shifted power
to shareholders and thus changed management priorities, so leading to a reduction of growth
rates. All in all, financialisation has been a fundamental factor behind the recovery of profits
from the 1980s in the leading capitalist economy as well as a phenomenon involved in a slow-
down of real capital accumulation. Unsurprisingly, the average growth rate of most advanced
countries, during the US financial expansion of the post-1970s, has been lower than in the
post-WWII “regulated capitalism”.
Given this empirical and historical framework, we analysed the role of dividends distrib-
uted by firms and banks, highlighting the effects of their increase on financial instability
and macroeconomic dynamics. In particular, we investigated the tendency towards finan-
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cialisation, which involved firms along the shift from a “retain and reinvest” approach to a
“downsize and distribute” strategy, by varying some of the model parameters, so simulating
firms’ and banks’ behaviours under alternative settings. As for the modelling framework, we
perfomed our analysis in an agent based setting in which the macroeconomy is a complex sys-
tem populated by heterogeneous agents (households, firms and banks) which directly interact
in different markets (goods, labour, credit, and bank deposits). Then, there are two policy
makers: the government and the central bank. In this context, aggregate regularities emerge
from the “bottom up” as statistical properties at the meso and macro levels that derive from
the (simple and adaptive) individual behavioural rules and the interaction mechanisms which
describe the working of markets.
Model simulations show that when firms and banks decide to increase the fraction of profits
to be distributed as dividends, the rate of unemployment tends to rise. Higher unemployment
results in lower wages that, in turn, may have two different effects: on the one hand, it reduces
workers’ consumption; on the other hand, it reduces firms’ production costs and, if a part of
dividends finances consumption, then the firms’ profit rate may rise. This implies a decline
of the wage share (because wages decrease at a faster rate than price inflation). So, this type
of “financialisation” of the macroeconomic system may work based on the substitution of a
part of wages with a fraction of dividends in the financing of consumption. This is, however,
a temporary solution, given that the reduced fraction of retained profits results in a decrease
of firms’ and banks’ net worth. In this scenario, firms need more credit (due to a lower level
of internal funds) while banks are characterised by a reduced amount of credit supply. In this
situation firms may face credit rationing and they may be forced to reduce their leverage.
As a consequence, firms cannot hire the desired number of workers and the unemployment
rate goes up, while the volatility of the financial and of the macroeconomic system increases.
Moreover, the rise of unemployment further deteriorates the problem of aggregate demand
insufficiency and this may result in an extended crisis.
Thus, we detected a negative impact of increasing dividend yields, although the relation-
ship is highly non-linear: the system does not exhibit huge problems below a certain threshold,
while above that it is quite likely to observe large crises and even a complete crash of the
economy. All in all, financialisation through increasing dividends impacts financial instability
and income distribution, with relevant consequences on macroeconomic dynamics.
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